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How do individuals decide to act based on a
rewarding status quo versus an unexplored choice
that might yield a better outcome? Recent evidence
suggests that individuals may strategically explore
as a function of the relative uncertainty about the
expected value of options. However, the neural
mechanisms supporting uncertainty-driven explo-
ration remain underspecified. The present fMRI
study scanned a reinforcement learning task in
which participants stop a rotating clock hand in
order to win points. Reward schedules were such
that expected value could increase, decrease, or
remain constant with respect to time. We fit several
mathematical models to subject behavior to
generate trial-by-trial estimates of exploration as
a function of relative uncertainty. These estimates
were used to analyze our fMRI data. Results indi-
cate that rostrolateral prefrontal cortex tracks
trial-by-trial changes in relative uncertainty, and
this pattern distinguished individuals who rely on
relative uncertainty for their exploratory decisions
versus those who do not.
INTRODUCTION
Learning to make choices in a complex world is a difficult
problem. The uncertainty attending such decisions requires a
trade-off between two contradictory courses of action: (1) to
choose from among known options those that are believed to
yield the best outcomes, or (2) to explore new, unknown alterna-
tives in hope of an even better result (e.g., when at your favorite
restaurant, do you try the chef’s new special or your ‘‘usual’’
choice?). This well-known exploration-exploitation dilemma
(Sutton and Barto, 1998) deeply complicates decision making,
with optimal solutions for even simple environments often being
unknown or computationally intractable (Cohen et al., 2007).
Abundant evidence now supports striatal dopaminergic mecha-
nisms in learning to exploit (see Doll and Frank, 2009; Maia,
2009 for review). By contrast, considerably less is known about
the neural mechanisms driving exploration (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005; Daw et al., 2006; Frank et al., 2009).In the reinforcement learning literature, exploration is often
modeled using stochastic choice rules. Such rules permit agents
to exploit the best known actions for reward while also discov-
ering better actions over time by periodically choosing at random
or by increasing stochasticity of choice when options have
similar expected values (Sutton and Barto, 1998). A more effi-
cient strategy is to direct exploratory choices to those actions
about which one is most uncertain (Dayan and Sejnowski,
1996; Gittins and Jones, 1974). Put another way, the drive to
explore may vary in proportion to the differential uncertainty
about the outcomes from alternative courses of action. Thus,
from this perspective, the brain should track changes in relative
uncertainty among options, at least in those individuals who rely
on this strategy for exploratory choices.
Neurons in prefrontal cortex (PFC) may track relative uncer-
tainty during decision making. Using fMRI, Daw et al., (2006)
observed activation in rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC;
approximately Brodmann area [BA] 10/46) during a ‘‘multi-
armed bandit task’’ when participants selected slot machines
that did not have the highest expected value. Daw et al. tested
whether participants guide exploration toward uncertain
options, but did not find evidence for an ‘‘uncertainty bonus.’’
However, the reward contingencies were not stationary, and
participants overestimated the rate of change, effectively
only including the last trial’s reward in their expected value
estimations (i.e., they had a learning rate near 1.0). Thus, while
the dynamic contingencies strongly induced uncertainty about
the value of unexplored options, this manipulation may have
paradoxically precluded the identification of an uncertainty
bonus, because participants believed that only the previous
trial was relevant.
Frank et al. (2009) recently showed evidence that quantitative
trial-by-trial exploratory responses are in part driven by relative
uncertainty when reinforcement contingencies are stationary
over time. Moreover, substantial individual differences in uncer-
tainty-driven exploration were observed, a large part of which
were accounted for by a polymorphism in the catechol-O-methyl
transferase (COMT) gene that affects PFC dopamine levels. A
subsequent study with the same task found that uncertainty-
driven exploration was substantially reduced in patients with
schizophrenia as a function of anhedonia, also thought to be
related to PFC dysfunction (Strauss et al., 2011). These findings
provide a general link between relative uncertainty-based explo-
ration and PFC function. Frank et al. (2009) further hypothesized
that RLPFC, in particular, may track relative uncertainty among
options.Neuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 595
Figure 1. Behavioral Task with Plots of Reward
Function Conditions
(A) On each trial, participants stopped a rotating clock
hand to win points.
(B) The probability of reward as a function of RT for each
expected value condition: increasing (IEV), decreasing
(DEV), constant (CEV), and constant-reversed (CEVR).
(C) The magnitude of reward as a function of RT across EV
conditions.
(D) The expected value as a function of RT for condition.
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Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex and ExplorationDespite the failure to observe uncertainty-basedmodulation of
RLPFC activity in previous gambling tasks, the hypothesis that
RLPFC computes relative uncertainty is consistent with the
broader human neuroimaging literature. Activation in RLPFC is
greater during computations of uncertainty during goal attain-
ment in navigation (Yoshida and Ishii, 2006) and has been shown
to track relative reward probabilities for alternative courses of
action (Boorman et al., 2009). More broadly, growing evidence
suggests that RLPFC is at the apex of a caudal to rostral hierar-
chical organization in frontal cortex (Badre, 2008; Koechlin et al.,
2003; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). In this organization,
more rostral PFC regions exert control over action at more
abstract levels. One conception of abstraction is that which
involves tracking higher-order relations (Braver and Bongiolatti,
2002; Bunge andWendelken, 2009; Bunge et al., 2005; Christoff
et al., 2001; Kroger et al., 2002; Koechlin et al., 1999).
In this respect, Bunge and Wendelken (2009) interpreted the
Boorman et al. (2009) result as indicative of a more fundamental
computation of the RLPFC in tracking the relative advantage of
switching to alternative courses of action, rather than of reward
probabilities, per se. In keeping with this suggestion, we hypoth-
esized that, while in environments in which participants explore
based on relative uncertainty, activation in RLPFC would
track changes in relative uncertainty. We further posited that
individual differences in uncertainty-driven exploration might
be accompanied by differences in the RLPFC response to rela-
tive uncertainty.
In order to test our hypotheses, we scanned participants in
fMRI while they performed a temporal utility integration task
(Frank et al., 2009; Moustafa et al., 2008). In this task, partici-
pants observe a clock hand make a clockwise rotation about a
clock face over a 5 s interval (Figure 1A). Participants press a
button on a keypad to stop the rotation and win points. The
probability and magnitude of rewards varied as a function of596 Neuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.response time (RT), such that the expected
value increased, decreased, or stayed constant
for different levels of RT (Figures 1C and 1D). For
a given function, participants can learn the
optimal style of responding (e.g., fast or slow)
to maximize their reward.
RESULTS
Computational Model
Individual subject performance on the task was
fit using a previously developed mathematicalmodel (Frank et al., 2009) that allows trial-by-trial estimates of
several key components of exploratory and exploitative choices.
In this model, different mechanisms advance these contradic-
tory drives in an attempt to maximize total reward. In what
follows, we will discuss the key components of the model rele-
vant to the current fMRI study (full model details are discussed
in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures, available online).
We also conducted a number of simulations using simplified and
alternative models in order to assess robustness of the effect of
relative uncertainty in RLPFC and its sensitivity to the specific
model instantiation. These alternate models are described fully
further below and in the Supplemental Information, though we
will briefly refer to them here.
Both exploitation of the RTs producing the highest rewards
and exploration for even better rewards are driven by errors of
prediction in tracking expected reward value V. Specifically,
the expected reward value on trial t is:
VðtÞ=Vðt  1Þ+adðt  1Þ (1)
where a is the rate at which new outcomes are integrated into
the evaluation V and d is the reward prediction error [RPE; Re-
ward(t  1) – V(t  1)] conveyed by midbrain dopamine neurons
(Montague et al., 1996).
A strategic exploitation component tracks the reward struc-
ture associated with distinct response classes (categorized as
‘‘fast’’ or ‘‘slow,’’ respectively). This component is intended to
capture how participants track the reward structure for alterna-
tive actions, allowing them to continuously adjust RTs in propor-
tion to their relative value differences. The motivation for this
modeling choice was that participants were told at the outset
that sometimes it will be better to respond faster and sometimes
slower. Given that the reward functions are monotonic, all the
learner needs to do is track the relative values of fast and slow
Figure 2. Illustration of Changes in Beta Distributions over the
Course of Learning across Different Task Conditions
The x axis plots the probability that a particular action will yield a positive
reward prediction error (RPE). Each curve plots the level of belief (y axis) that
a participant has about each probability for a given course of action, which in
this task are operationalized as responding faster (green curves) or slower (red
curves). The peak of each curve represents the subject’s strongest belief
about the value of a particular option. Exploitative responses move in the
direction of the highest perceived value. Hence, under IEV conditions (left plot)
slower responses are more likely to yield a positive RPE, whereas in DEV
conditions (right plot) faster responses have higher value. The standard devi-
ation of the distribution reflects the participant’s uncertainty regarding the
value of that option. Thus, early in learning (dashed line) the width is larger (and
uncertainty greater) than later in learning (solid line). The difference in the
standard deviations of these fast and slow distributions at any given trial is
relative uncertainty.
Neuron
Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex and Explorationresponses and proportionately adjust RTs toward larger value.
More specifically, the model assumes that participants track
the probability of obtaining a better than average outcome
(a positive RPE) following faster or slower responses, which
are separately computed via Bayesian integration:
Pðqjd1.dnÞfPðd1.dnjqÞPðqÞ (2)
where q represents the parameters of the probability distribution,
and d1. dn are the prediction errors observed thus far (on trials 1
to n). Frank et al. (2009) previously reported that the behavioral
data were best fit with the simplifying assumption that subjects
track the probability of positive RPEs, which can be accom-
plished by ‘‘counting phasic dopamine bursts,’’ rather than the
specific expected reward values of the different responses. As
such, q consists of beta distributed, Beta(h,b), estimates of posi-
tive prediction errors expected for fast and slow responses (Fig-
ure 2). Parameters from alternative models in which expected
reward magnitude is tracked are strongly correlated with those
from this model that tracks the probability of RPE. But model
fits are superior for the RPE model, which also yields uncertainty
estimates that are potentially more suitable for fMRI (see Supple-
mental Information).
Given the learned expected values, the difference of their
means (mslow, mfast) contributes to response latency on trial t
scaled by free parameter r:
r½mslowðtÞ  mfastðtÞ (3)
It is important to clarify that though the reward statistics are
tracked for different categorical actions (i.e., in terms of ‘‘fast’’versus ‘‘slow’’), the predicted RTs are continuous as a function
of these statistics. More specifically, RTs are predicted to contin-
uously adjust in proportion to the difference in mean reward
statistics, in that a larger difference in values for fast and slow
leads to larger changes in RT.
Finally, the exploratory component of the model capitalizes on
the uncertainty of the probability distributions to strategically
explore those responses for which reward statistics are most
uncertain. Specifically, the model assumes that subjects explore
uncertain responses to reduce this uncertainty. This component
is computed as:
ExploreðtÞ= ε½sslowðtÞ  sfastðtÞ; (4)
where sslow and sfast are the uncertainties, quantified in terms of
standard deviations of the probability distributions tracked by
the Bayesian update rule (Figure 2), and ε is a free parameter
controlling the degree to which subjects make exploratory
responses in proportion to relative uncertainty.
In the primary model, we constrained ε to be greater than
0 to estimate the degree to which relative uncertainty guides
exploration, and to prevent the model fits from leveraging this
parameter to account for variance related to perseveration
during exploitation. However, we also report a series of alternate
models for which ε is unconstrained (i.e., it is also allowed to go
negative to reflect ‘‘ambiguity aversion’’; Payzan-LeNestour and
Bossaerts, 2011).
These exploit and explore mechanisms, together with other
components, afford quantitative fits of RT adjustments in this
task, and the combined model is identical to that determined
to provide the best fit in prior work. However, to ensure that rela-
tive uncertainty results do not depend on the use of this partic-
ular model, we also report results from several alternate models
that are more transparently related to those used in the tradi-
tional reinforcement learning literature. In these models, we treat
fast and slow responses categorically (as in a two-armed bandit
task) and predict their probability of occurrence with a standard
softmax choice function, with parameters optimized by
maximum likelihood (as opposed to the standard model, which
minimizes squared error between predicted and actual RT). We
consider models in which reward structure of these categorical
responses is acquired via either Bayesian integration or rein-
forcement learning (Q-learning).
To summarize, then, model fits provide subject-specific, trial-
by-trial estimates of reward prediction error (d+, d), the mean
expected values about the likelihood of a positive prediction
error for fast and slow responses (mslow, mfast), and the uncer-
tainties about these estimates (sslow, sfast). The model also
provides estimates of individual participant’s reliance on relative
uncertainty to explore (ε). We used these estimates to analyze
our fMRI data and provide an explicit test of the hypothesis
that RLPFC tracks relative uncertainty to strategically guide
exploration (see Supplemental Analysis and Figure S1 for the
analysis of reward prediction error).
Behavioral Results and Model Performance
Across conditions (Figure 1), participants reliably adjusted
RTs in the direction indicative of learning (Figure 3A). During
the second half of each learning block, RTs in the decreasingNeuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 597
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Figure 3. Plots of Behavioral Results and Model Fits to Individual Participant Behavior
(A) Average RT across participants demonstrates that incremental adjustments in RT were consistent with learning.
(B) Average of individual subject model fits captured incremental adjustments in RT across learning conditions.
(C) A plot from one representative participant illustrates that changes in the Explore term (blue) partially captures trial-to-trial swings in RT (green).
(D) Correlation between RT swings and relative uncertainty among explorers (left) and nonexplorers. All trials in all participants are plotted in aggregate with color
distinguishing individuals. The correlation between RT swings and relative uncertainty was significantly different from zero in explorers (mean r = 0.36, p < 0.0001),
but not in nonexplorers (mean r = 0.02, p > 0.5).
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Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex and Explorationexpected value (DEV) condition were significantly faster than
in constant expected value [CEV; F(1,14) = 13.95, p < 0.005].
Likewise, RTs in the increasing expected value (IEV) condi-
tion were significantly slower than in CEV [F(1,14) = 5.6,
p < 0.05] during the second half of each learning block. Within
each condition, participants reliably sped up from the first to
second half of trials in DEV [F(1,14) = 8.2, p < 0.05] and slowed
down in IEV [F(1,14) = 5.1, p < 0.05]. There were no reli-
able differences in RT from first to second half of trials in
CEV or constant expected value-reversed conditions (CEVR;
p values > 0.5).598 Neuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.These incremental RT adaptations over the course of learning
were well captured by the mathematical model (Figure 3B). As in
prior studies, these adaptations were observed in the average
learning curve within and across individuals. In contrast, trial-
by-trial changes in RT were not incremental but were character-
ized by large ‘‘RT swings’’ (Frank et al., 2009). The model
captured some of the variance in these swings by assuming
that they reflect exploratory RT adjustments in the direction of
greater uncertainty about the reward statistics (Figure 3C).
Across subjects, the r-values reflecting the correlation between
the direction of RT swing from one trial to the next and the
Neuron
Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex and Explorationmodel’s estimate of relative uncertainty were reliably greater
than zero (t = 3.9; p < 0.05). The improvement in model fit by
including the uncertainty-driven exploration component
(and penalizing for the added model complexity; see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures) was correlated with the esti-
mated ε parameter (r = 0.68, p = 0.005; this result held even
when allowing ε to reach negative values; see below). Thus, indi-
vidual differences in uncertainty-driven exploration were
captured both by improvement in model fit and by the estimated
ε parameter. Indeed, out of 15 participants, eight had ε parame-
ters greater than 0 (hereafter, ‘‘explorers’’). This fitted positive ε
parameter captured the tendency for explorers’ RT swings to
adjust in the direction of greater uncertainty. Indeed, the correla-
tion between RT swings and relative uncertainty was significantly
different from zero in explorers (mean r = 0.36, p < 0.0001),
but not in nonexplorers (mean r = 0.02, p > 0.5; Figure 3D).
To further test whether the fitted ε parameter largely accounts
for RT swings (rather than some overall tendency to direct RTs
toward more or less certain actions), we constructed another
model in which we explicitly modeled changes in RT (RT(t) –
RT(t  1)) rather than overall RT, with ε unconstrained (i.e., ε
could be positive or negative). In this analysis, the fitted ε corre-
lated with that from the standard model (Spearman rho = 0.55,
p = 0.03) and was significantly greater than zero (p < 0.0001).
Notably, the improvement in model fit by including ε (as as-
sessed by Aikake’s Information Criterion; AIC) was strongly
correlatedwith the fitted ε value, such that individuals fit by larger
(more positive) ε values were characterized by greater improve-
ments in fit (r = 0.88, p < 0.0001). Comparing the original
explorers versus nonexplorers, improvement in model fit to RT
swings was significantly greater in explorers (mean DAIC = 26,
nonexplorers mean DAIC = 13; t(13) = 2.2, p = 0.046). Other
alternative models, in which ε was unconstrained, fit to overall
RT (reported below in conjunction with fMRI analysis; Table
S1) led to similar results, showing that including the uncer-
tainty-driven exploration term yielded robustly better fits to the
data in explorers but not nonexplorers.
Thus, having identified individual differences in exploration
based on participants’ behavior, we sought to determine the
neural correlates of relative uncertainty and whether these differ
between explorers and nonexplorers.
Relative Uncertainty and Right Rostrolateral PFC
In the model, the standard deviations of the beta distributions for
each response provide trial-by-trial estimates of uncertainty
about the likelihood of obtaining a better outcome than average
for each response option. Relative uncertainty—the difference in
standard deviation of the beta distributions for slow and fast
responses (jsslow  sfastj)—is hypothesized to drive exploratory
responding (Figure 4A).
We initially assessed relative uncertainty as a parametric func-
tion associated with stimulus onset (Figure 4A). This analysis
yielded activation in RLPFC (XYZ = 36 56 8; p < 0.001 [FWE
cluster corrected]), alongwith awide network of other neocortical
regions (see Table S2), in association with relative uncertainty.
Importantly, based on prior work (e.g., Frank et al., 2009), indi-
vidual participantsmay rely to different degrees on relative uncer-
tainty tomake exploratory responses. Consistent with this obser-vation, when the whole-brain voxel-wise analysis of relative
uncertainty was restricted to the ‘‘explorer’’ participants (ε > 0),
reliable activation was evident in right RLPFC both in a ventral
RLPFC cluster (XYZ = 40 60 10; 30 52 14; p < 0.001 [FWE
cluster level]) and in a more dorsal RLPFC cluster (XYZ = 24 48
20; 30 52 16; 18 40 22; p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level]), along with
a set of occipital and parietal regions (see Table S2). By contrast,
the analysis of relative uncertainty in the nonexplore group (ε = 0)
did not locate reliable activation in right RLPFC. This group differ-
ence in RLPFCwas confirmed in a direct group contrast, locating
reliably greater activation for explore thannonexploreparticipants
in dorsal RLPFC (XYZ = 24 46 20; p < 0.005 [FWE cluster level]).
It is conceivable that effects of relative uncertainty in RLPFC
are confounded by shared variance due to mean uncertainty.
There are a number of ways that relative and mean uncertainty
might share variance. For example, both mean and relative
uncertainty can decline monotonically during the course of
a block (i.e., to the extent that the participant samples reward
outcomes from both fast and slow responses). Thus, to estimate
relative uncertainty independent of its shared variance with
mean uncertainty, we conducted a second whole-brain analysis
in which the parametric regressor for mean uncertainty (see
below) was entered prior to that for relative uncertainty, and
therefore any relative uncertainty effects are over and above
the effects of mean uncertainty (this model was used for all
subsequent relative uncertainty analyses). From this analysis,
the voxel-wise analysis of the unique effects of relative uncer-
tainty in ‘‘explorer’’ participants (ε > 0) again yielded reliable
activation in right RLPFC (Figure 4B) in ventral (XYZ = 30
52 14; 36 56 10; p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level]) and dorsal
RLPFC (XYZ = 22 56 26; 26 52 16; 44 42 28; p < 0.001 [FWE
cluster level]; Table S2). Changes in relative uncertainty in
explore subjects also correlated with activation in the superior
parietal lobule (SPL; 8 62 66; 16 70 62; 24 68 68;
p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level]). The nonexplore group (ε = 0) did
not locate reliable activation in right RLPFC, and again, uncer-
tainty-related activation was greater for explore than nonexplore
participants in dorsal RLPFC (XYZ = 22 54 28; 28 48 14; 22 46 20;
p < 0.005 [FWE cluster level]; Figure 4C). A follow up demon-
strated these effects even when analysis was restricted to only
the first half of trials within a block, thereby ruling out confounds
related to fatigue or other factors that could affect responding
once learning has occurred (see Supplemental Information).
ROI analysis, using an RLPFC ROI defined from a neutral task
effects contrast in the full group (XYZ = 27 50 28; Figure 5C),
confirmed the results of the whole brain analysis. Specifically,
the effect of relative uncertainty in right RLPFC was reliable for
the explore participants [t(7) = 4.5, p < 0.005] but not the nonex-
plore participants [t(6) = 1.2], and the direct comparison between
groups was significant [t(13) > 4.4, p < 0.005]. Further ROI anal-
ysis also demonstrated these effects using ROIs in RLPFC
defined based on coordinates from prior studies of exploration
(i.e., Daw et al., 2006 and Boorman et al., 2009; see Supple-
mental Information).
Relative Uncertainty in Alternative Models
The primary model of learning and decision making in this task
was drawn directly from prior work (Frank et al., 2009) to permitNeuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 599
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Figure 4. Whole-Brain Analysis of Trial-to-Trial Changes in Relative Uncertainty
(A) Example individual subject relative uncertainty regressor from one run of one participant. Convolution of parametric changes in relative uncertainty (jsslow(t)
sfast(t)j) on each trial (top plot) with a canonical hemodynamic response function (middle plot) produced individual participant relative uncertainty regressors
(bottom plot).
(B) The effect of relative uncertainty, controlling for mean uncertainty and restricted to explore participants (ε > 0), revealed activation in dorsal and ventral RLPFC
regions (rendered at p < 0.05 FWE corrected [cluster level]).
(C) Contrast of relative uncertainty effect, controlling for mean uncertainty, in explore (ε > 0) versus nonexplore (ε = 0) participants revealed a group difference in
RLPFC (rendered at p < 0.05 FWE corrected [cluster level]).
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Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex and Explorationconsistency and comparability between studies. However, we
next sought to establish that the effects of relative uncertainty
observed in RLPFC were not wholly dependent on specific
choices made in constructing the computational model itself.
Thus, we constructed three alternative models that relied on
the same relative uncertainty computation as the primary model
but differed in other details of their implementation that may
affect which specific subjects are identified as explorers (see
Supplemental Information for modeling details).
First, we eased the constraint that ε be greater than or equal to
0. In the primary model, we added this constraint so that model
fits could not leverage this parameter to account for variance
related to perseveration, particularly on exploit trials. However,
in certain task contexts some individuals may consistently avoid
uncertain choices (i.e., uncertainty aversion; Payzan-LeNestour
and Bossaerts, 2011; Strauss et al., 2011). It follows, then, that
these individuals might track uncertainty in order to avoid it,
perhaps reflected by a negative ε parameter. Alternatively, ε
may attain negative values if participants simply exploit on the600 Neuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.majority of trials, such that the exploitative option is selected
most often and hence has the most certain reward statistics
(assuming that value-based exploitation is not perfectly
captured by the model). Thus a negative ε need not necessarily
imply uncertainty aversion, and it could be that the smaller
proportion of exploratory trials is still guided toward uncertainty.
Thus, we conducted three simulations in which ε was uncon-
strained (see also earlier model of RT swings).
In an initial simulation, we categorized responses as explor-
atory or not, where exploration is defined by selecting responses
with lower expected value (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw et al.,
2006). While we fit the remaining model parameters across all
trials, we fixed ε = 0 on all exploitation trials and allowed it to
vary only in trials defined as exploratory. The goal of this proce-
dure was to determine whether exploratory trials were more
often driven toward the most uncertain option and to prevent
the fitting procedure from penalizing the model fit in all of the
exploitation trials in which the more certain action is generally
selected.
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Figure 5. Whole-Brain and ROI Analysis of Mean and Relative Uncertainty
(A) Example individual subject mean uncertainty regressor from one run of one participant. Convolution of parametric changes in mean uncertainty ([sslow(t) +
sfast(t)]/2) on each trial (top plot) with a canonical hemodynamic response function (middle plot) produced individual participant mean uncertainty regressors
(bottom plot).
(B) Mean uncertainty in the whole group, controlling for relative uncertainty, yielded activation in a large neocortical network including right DLPFC (rendered at
p < 0.05 FWE corrected [cluster level]).
(C) ROI analysis based on extracted beta estimates of relative uncertainty confirmed a group difference in relative uncertainty within RLPFC and showed a greater
effect of relative uncertainty in RLPFC than DLPFC in explorers (*p < 0.05).
(D) ROI analysis based on extracted beta estimates of mean uncertainty found no differences in mean uncertainty between groups.
All error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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explorers identified by the primary model) were best fit with posi-
tive ε, and the remaining eight were fit with negative ε. Analysis of
relative uncertainty in the explore subjects identified from this
model yielded reliable effects in ventral RLPFC (XYZ = 30
56 12; p < 0.05 [FWE cluster level]) and IPS (XYZ = 36 46
56; p < 0.005 [FWE cluster level]). Participants with negative ε
from this model did not yield positive or negative correlations
of relative uncertainty with activation in RLPFC.
Another reason ε could attain negative values is due to partic-
ipants’ tendencies to repeatedly select the same option as
previous trials (independent from their values; Lau and Glimcher,
2005; Scho¨nberg et al., 2007), where again this repeated option
would have greater certainty. To factor out this perseveration or
‘‘sticky choice’’ component, we not only allowed the immediately
preceding trial’s RT to influence the current trial, but also allowed
multiple previous trials to do so with exponential decay. This
analysis allowed ε to be estimated as positive or negative across
all trials. Here, six of the original eight explorers were best fit with
positive ε, and the remaining participants had negative ε.This model with unconstrained ε and sticky choice provided
a reliably better fit than the model without either sticky choice
or uncertainty, even penalizing for the additional model
complexity (improvement in DAIC = 31.0 [9.2]), or compared to
a model that does include sticky choice but no uncertainty
(DAIC = 3.3 [1.8]). Furthermore, as in the RT swing model, the
fitted ε parameter value correlated with this improvement in fit
(r = 0.51, p = 0.05; and r = 0.53, p = 0.04 for the two model
comparisons), suggesting that more positive uncertainty-driven
exploration parameters are contributing to better fits rather
than the negative ones. Analysis of the fMRI data restricted to
the six subjects estimated to be explorers by this model still
yielded reliable relative uncertainty effects in dorsal RLPFC
(XYZ = 26 52 16; p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level]) along with SPL
(XYZ = 6 60 60; p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level]; Table S2).
Participants estimated to have a negative ε again did not show
positive or negative correlations of relative uncertainty with
activation in RLPFC.
Finally, we constructed a model that fit categorical rather than
continuous RT distributions. As already noted, a feature of theNeuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 601
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consistent with the continuous nature of RT in this task.
However, reward statistics are tracked based on two modes of
responding, fast or slow. So, in a final set of simulations, we
matched the response choice function to reward learning and
only attempted to predict categorical action selection between
fast and slow responses as if it were a two-armed bandit task,
rather than predicting a continuous RT distribution (maximizing
the likelihood of fast or slow responses). The core of this model
is a softmax logistic function, which only included the following:
a parameter that estimates any overall bias to respond fast or
slow, an (unconstrained) ε parameter for uncertainty bonus,
a softmax gain parameter, and an estimate of the value of the
two actions. The latter was simulated either as the mean of the
beta distribution or a Q-value learned via reinforcement learning
(RL) with an estimated learning rate. This categorical model iden-
tified a group of eight explore participants (ε > 0) that largely
overlapped with the primary model (two of 15 participants
differed in assignment). Notably, the relative uncertainty effect
in the eight explore participants from this categorical model
yielded activation in dorsal RLPFC (XYZ = 24 50 18; 34 52 16;
44 42 28; p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level]), ventral RLPFC (XYZ =
36 56 10; p < 0.005 [FWE cluster level]), and SPL (XYZ =
864 66; p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level]; Table S2). Again, there
were no positive or negative correlations with relative uncertainty
in RLPFC in the participants with negative ε.
Thus, the effects of relative uncertainty in RLPFC were robust
to these variations of the model. Moreover, in these models
without a positive ε constraint, we did not find evidence that
RLPFC tracks relative uncertainty in support of uncertainty aver-
sion (i.e., participants with negative ε). However, this leaves open
how to interpret negative epsilon in the nonexplore participants.
As noted above, one possibility is that participants tend to
repeatedly select the same option independent from their values.
When controlling for sticky choice in the categorical model, the
majority of participants were best characterized by positive ε
(11 or 13 out of 15 participants for beta or Q-learning variants,
respectively). A likelihood ratio test confirmed that including an
uncertainty exploration bonus provided a significantly better fit
(and including penalization of extra parameters) across the
group of explorers (defined from those in the standard model;
p < 0.00001), but only marginally so in nonexplorers (p = 0.053;
the test was significant across the whole group, p < 0.00001).
In the Q version, the likelihood ratio test was again significant
in the explorers, p = 0.00002, but not in the nonexplorers (p =
0.15; thus the slightly positive ε values did not contribute to
model fit). This test was again significant across the entire group
(p = 0.00005). As in prior models, the fitted ε parameter corre-
lated with improvement in likelihood relative to a model without
uncertainty driven exploration (r = 0.71, p = 0.003). Thus in these
simplified models predicting categorical choice, only explorers
showed a robust improvement in fit by incorporating relative
uncertainty into the model, and a fit of negative epsilon seems
largely explained by the tendency to perseverate independently
of value. This result also implies that the earlier findings are not
solely due to a directional change in RT due to uncertainty
(e.g., from a slow response to a slightly faster but still slow
response), but are sufficient to induce a categorical shift.602 Neuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.Mean Uncertainty and Right DLPFC
Relative uncertainty comparisons may require separately main-
taining and updating working memory with the reward statistics
for each option (including their variance). In light of the putative
rostro-caudal organization of frontal cortex (Badre, 2008), we
hypothesized that uncertainty about each option might be main-
tained by DLPFC regions caudal to RLPFC that do not neces-
sarily track changes in relative uncertainty.
Results from the analysis of mean uncertainty were broadly
consistent with this hypothesis. As a metric of the overall level
of uncertainty associated with all options in the task, we
computed a mean uncertainty regressor as the trial-by-trial
average ofsslow andsfast (Figure 5A). Aswith relative uncertainty,
we tested mean uncertainty in a model that entered relative
uncertainty first, thereby permitting estimation of the effects of
mean uncertainty over and above that sharedwith relative uncer-
tainty. Mean uncertainty was associated with a widely distrib-
uted fronto-parietal network (Figure 5B) that included right
DLPFC (XYZ = 38 30 34; 30 26 20; 46 14 28; p < 0.001 [FWE
cluster level]). In addition, this whole-brain voxel-wise contrast
revealed activation p < 0.001 [FWE cluster level] in regions of
supplementary motor area (XYZ = 8 12 62), right dorsal premotor
cortex (XYZ = 56 16 38), and a large bilateral cluster encompass-
ing occipital and posterior parietal cortex. ROI analysis using
neutrally defined ROIs in both right DLPFC (XYZ = 40 30 34)
and the right RLPFC confirmed the effects of the whole-brain
analysis, locating significant effects of mean uncertainty in
both regions [DLPFC: t(14) = 5.6, p < 0.0001; RLPFC: t(14) =
3.1, p < 0.01; Figure 5D].
Unlike relative uncertainty, the effect of mean uncertainty did
not differ as a function of individual differences in exploration
(explore versus nonexplore). Rather, ROI analysis confirmed
that there were no group differences in mean uncertainty in
DLPFC (t = 0.5) or in RLPFC (t = 0.14). Unlike relative uncer-
tainty—which was greater in RLPFC than DLPFC (t = 2.1, p <
0.05) in the explorers and not in the nonexplorers [t = 1.9; Group
x Region: F(1,13) = 9.2, p < 0.01; Figure 5C]—mean uncertainty
did not differ reliably between groups or regions (Figure 5D). This
result suggests that the distinguishing trait of explore partici-
pants depends on computing the relative difference in uncer-
tainties between options (supported by RLPFC more than
DLPFC), an indicator of the potential value of information gained
by exploring, rather than simply representing uncertainty or
reward statistics.
DISCUSSION
When deciding among different actions, we are often faced
with tension between exploiting options that have previously
yielded good outcomes and exploring new options that might
be even better. One means of strategic exploration is to choose
new options in proportion to their degree of uncertainty relative
to the status quo. This strategy requires tracking not only the
expected values of candidate options, but also the relative
uncertainties about them. In the present study, we used
subject-specific, trial-by-trial estimates of relative uncertainty
derived from a computational model to show that RLPFC tracks
relative uncertainty in those individuals who rely on this metric
Neuron
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model’s structure.
In models of reinforcement learning, the predominant
approach to exploration is to stochastically sample choices
that do not have the highest expected value (e.g., Boltzmann
‘‘softmax’’ choice function; Sutton and Barto, 1998). This
stochasticity is flexible: it increases when expected values of
available options are similar, thereby increasing exploration.
Moreover, the degree of stochasticity (the temperature of the
softmax function) is thought to be under dynamic neuromodula-
tory control by cortical norepinephrine, perhaps as a function of
reinforcement history (Cohen et al., 2007; Frank et al., 2007). On
the other hand, such regulatory mechanisms are only moder-
ately strategic in that by effectively increasing noise, they are
insensitive to the amount of information that could be gained
by exploring one alternative action over another (indeed,
a stochastic choice mechanism is equally likely to sample the
exploited option). Amore strategic approach is to direct explora-
tion toward those options having the most uncertain rein-
forcement contingencies relative to the exploited option, so
exploration optimizes the information gained.
Whether the brain supports such directed, uncertainty-driven
exploration has been understudied. Though prior fMRI studies
have associated RLPFC with exploratory decision making
(Daw et al., 2006), these data were suggestive of a more
stochastic (undirected) approach to exploration, with no
evidence for an uncertainty bonus. However, as already noted,
this may have been due to participants’ belief that contingencies
were rapidly changing. In contrast, when contingencies were
stationary within blocks of trials, Frank et al. (2009) reported
evidence for an influence of uncertainty on exploratory response
adjustments, and that individual differences in uncertainty-
driven exploration were predicted by genetic variants affecting
PFC function. However, though consistent with our hypothesis,
these data did not demonstrate that the PFC tracks relative
uncertainty during exploratory decisions. The present results
fill this important gap and show that quantitative trial-by-trial esti-
mates of relative uncertainty are correlated with signal change in
RLPFC.
Individual Differences in Relative Uncertainty
Notably, the relative uncertainty effect in RLPFCwas strongest in
those participants who were estimated to rely on relative uncer-
tainty to drive exploration. This group difference was evident
despite the fact that changes in relative uncertainty in each
participant were independent of the model’s estimate of that
participant’s ε. This finding suggests not only that RLPFC must
track relative uncertainty for it to have an influence on behavior,
but also that this signal is not tracked obligatorily by the brain in
all individuals. Thus, a key question raised by the present result is
why RLPFC apparently tracks relative uncertainty in some indi-
viduals and not others?
One possibility is that this difference reflects strategy, whether
implicit or explicit. Some individuals may have previously
acquired the strategy that computing relative uncertainty is
adaptive for information gain in similar types of decision-making
situations. Thus, these individuals tend to track relative uncer-
tainty and so RLPFC is recruited for this function. However,from this perspective, nothing precludes ‘‘nonexplorers’’ from
tracking relative uncertainty in RLPFC were they to also employ
this strategy. Indeed, there was no indication that these partici-
pants were less likely to track themean uncertainty in the DLPFC
or RLPFC, putatively reflecting the computation of reward statis-
tics. Hence, strategy training may be sufficient to induce them to
consider the relative differences between the actions, as well.
Alternatively, a more basic difference in PFC function or
capacity might underlie the individual differences in RLPFC rela-
tive uncertainty effects. For example, prior work has shown that
nonexplorers were found to be more likely to carry val alleles of
a COMT gene polymorphism, which is associated with reduced
prefrontal dopamine function (Frank et al., 2009). As the partici-
pants with low ε parameters in the present study were those who
did not track relative uncertainty in RLPFC, this raises the
intriguing possibility that the present findings reflect a phenotypic
difference related to prefrontal catecholamine function. We
verified that when fitting the models described here with uncon-
strained ε to the 2009 genetic sample, we replicated the signifi-
cant gene-dose association reported there; notably, the
‘‘val/val’’ subjects were categorized as nonexplorers (on average
negative ε) whereas the ‘‘met/met’’ subjects continued to have
positive ε, with their RT swings correlated with relative uncer-
tainty. The breakdown of val/val and met/met individuals in the
population is roughly evenly distributed, as were the explorers
and nonexplorers reported here. However, genetic data were
not collected in the current sample, and so future genetic
imaging experiments with larger samples than those used here
will be required to resolve this question.
Importantly, the failure to locate a relative uncertainty effect in
the nonexplore group (ε = 0) should not be taken as conclusive
evidence that relative uncertainty is only tracked in those
participants who explore. For example, it is possible that the
assumptions of our model were better suited to capture behav-
ioral strategies of the explorers and that nonexplorers track other
metrics of relative uncertainty. However, model fits in Frank et al.
(2009) showed that nonexplorers were better captured by
a ‘‘reverse-momentum’’model in which individuals progressively
adjust RTs in one direction and then reverse, as though indis-
criminately sweeping the response options rather than guiding
exploration based on uncertainty.
Another possibility is that nonexplorers are sensitive to uncer-
tainty but are actually averse to it, as is typical in behavioral
economic studies (e.g., ambiguity aversion; Ellsberg, 1961).
Indeed, even explorers may be averse to uncertainty but explore
in order to reduce this uncertainty in the long run (i.e., they are
more averse to the uncertainty of the value of their policy than
to that of their local response). In several model variants in which
ε was allowed to attain negative values, it did so primarily in the
nonexplorers, but remained positive in the explorers. Neverthe-
less, small changes in the make-up of explorer versus non-
explorer groups did not change the conclusions about RLPFC.
Indeed, whereas positive ε was consistently associated with
relative uncertainty effects in RLPFC across the models, nega-
tive ε was not. Thus, though negative ε parameters in non-
explorer participants could in principle relate to ambiguity
aversion, we did not find evidence that these participants track
relative uncertainty to avoid it.Neuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 603
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make the same choice repeatedly regardless of reward statistics
(i.e., ‘‘sticky choice’’/perseveration; Lau and Glimcher, 2005;
Scho¨nberg et al., 2007). Perhaps consistent with this alternative
in the present task, when controlling for sticky choice, model fits
did not improve by inclusion of ε in the nonexplorers, whereas fits
did improve, and ε was reliably positive, in the explorers across
models. (See Supplemental Information for further discussion of
relative uncertainty compared with other forms of uncertainty).
Functional Anatomy of Uncertainty-Based Exploration
The general association of RLPFC with computations of relative
uncertainty is consistent with the broader literature concerning
the general function of this region. RLPFC has been widely
associated with higher cognitive function (Gilbert et al., 2006;
Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Tsujimoto et al., 2011; Wallis,
2010), including tasks requiring computations of higher-order
relations (Bunge and Wendelken, 2009; Christoff et al., 2001;
Kroger et al., 2002; Koechlin et al., 1999). These tasks require
a comparison to be made between the results of other subgoal
processes or internally maintained representations, such as in
analogical reasoning (Bunge et al., 2005; Krawczyk et al.,
2011; Speed, 2010), higher-order perceptual relations (Christoff
et al., 2003), or same-different recognition memory decisions
(Han et al., 2009).
The present task extends this general relational function to
include comparisons between the widths of probability distribu-
tions built on the basis of prediction error coding. This speaks,
first, to the domain generality and abstractness of the putative
relational representations coded in RLPFC (Bunge and Wen-
delken, 2009). Second, by way of extending previous studies
reporting main effect changes in RLPFC activation under condi-
tions requiring more relational processing, the present experi-
ment demonstrates that the relational effect in RLPFC may
vary parametrically with the magnitude of the relation being
computed.
A question left open by this and prior work is the exact nature
of the neural coding in RLPFC. In the present experiment, we
used the absolute value of the difference in relative uncertainty.
Thus, though the parametric effect indicates that the degree of
relative uncertainty is encoded in RLPFC neurons, it does not
indicate whether this neural representation encodes the link
between uncertainty and specific actions. One possibility is
that relative uncertainty is coded as an absolute difference signal
computed over representationsmaintained elsewhere. From this
perspective, a large difference in uncertainty—regardless of
sign—is a signal to explore. Thus, relative uncertainty acts as
a contextual signal independently of what specific choice consti-
tutes exploration at a givenmoment. In terms of where the action
choice is made, relative uncertainty signals from RLPFC might
provide a contextual signal to neurons in other regions, perhaps
in caudal frontal, striatal, and/or parietal cortex, that bias selec-
tion of an option in favor of that with the larger uncertainty rather
than the anticipated outcome or other factors. This more
abstract conception of relative uncertainty may fit more readily
with a broader view of RLPFC function in which it generally
computes relations among internally maintained contextual
representations of which uncertainty is only one type.604 Neuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.However, even if the sign of the relative uncertainty is built into
the RLPFC representation, it is not necessarily the case that it
must be reflected directly in peak BOLD response, as in acti-
vating when it is positive and deactivating when it is negative.
Positive and negative signs could be coded by different popula-
tions of active neurons (e.g., reflecting the degree to which
uncertainty is greater for either fast or slow responses), both of
which would result in an increase in synaptic metabolic activity
and so a concomitant BOLD increase regardless of the specific
sign being coded. Thus, demonstrating that RLPFC tracks the
absolute value of the relative uncertainty signal does not rule
out the possibility that the sign of the choice is nevertheless
coded in RLPFC. Future work, such as using pattern classifica-
tion, would be required to determine whether information about
the uncertain choice is encoded in RLPFC.
It should be noted that though the effects of relative uncer-
tainty were highly consistent in terms of their locus across
a number of controls and models tested here, two separate
subregions of RLPFCwere implicated across contrasts. A dorsal
RLPFC focus consistently tracked relative uncertainty in the
explore participants and in the difference between the explore
and nonexplore participants. A ventral focus was evident in the
explore participants and also across the entire group but did
not differ reliably between groups. The more ventral focus is
closer in proximity to both the region of RLPFC associated
with exploration by Daw et al. (2006) and the region associated
with tracking reward value of the unchosen option by Boorman
et al., (2009; though see Supplemental Information for an anal-
ysis of branching and the expected reward of the unchosen
option in the current task). We did not obtain region by effect
interactions and so are not proposing that a functional distinction
exists between these dorsal and ventral subdivisions. Neverthe-
less, activation clusters in these two subregions were clearly
spatially noncontiguous and were reliable under partially over-
lapping contrast conditions. Thus, future work should be careful
regarding the precise locus of effects in RLPFC and their consis-
tency across conditions.
Beyond RLPFC, we also consistently located activation in SPL
in association with relative uncertainty in the explore group.
Although this region was not reliably different between explorers
and nonexplorers, the relative uncertainty effect was found to be
reliable in SPL in explorers across the alternate models tested
here. Previous studies have reported activation parietal cortex
along with RLPFC during tasks requiring exploration (e.g., Daw
et al., 2006). However, the locus of these effects has been in
the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) rather than in SPL. Effects in IPS
were less consistently observed in the current study, and ROI
analysis of IPS defined from previous studies failed to locate reli-
able relative uncertainty effects in this region (see Supplemental
Information). This comes in contrast to the effects in RLPFC,
which are highly convergent in terms of neural locus. The reason
for the variability in parietal cortex cannot be inferred from the
present data set. However, one hypothesis is that it derives
from differences in attentional demands between the different
tasks. For example, SPL has been previously associated with
endogenous, transient shifts of spatial and object-oriented
attention (Yantis et al., 2002; Yantis and Serences, 2003),
perhaps as encouraged by the clock face design, and thus, the
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tion to new target locations on the clock. However, such
hypotheses would need to be tested directly in subsequent
experiments.
Relationship to Prior Studies on Exploration
and Uncertainty
Previous studies have not found an effect of uncertainty on
exploration (Daw et al., 2006; Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts,
2011). What accounts for the different results between these
studies? Of course, we report substantial individual differences,
such that some participants have positive ε values across
models, and it is only in these participants that RLPFC tracks
relative uncertainty.
Other considerations are worth noting, however. Modeling
exploration is not trivial, because it requires predicting that
participants make a response that counters their general
propensity to exploit the option with highest value, and therefore
any model of exploration requires knowing when this will occur.
Because exploited options are sampled more often, their
outcome uncertainties are generally lower than those of the alter-
native options. Thus, when the subject exploits, they are select-
ing the least uncertain option, making it more difficult to estimate
the positive influence of uncertainty on exploration. As noted
above, this problem is exacerbated by ‘‘sticky choice,’’ whereby
participants’ choices in a given trial are often autocorrelated with
those of previous trials independent of value. Finally, studies
failing to report an effect of uncertainty on exploration have all
used n-armed bandit tasks with dynamic reward contingencies
across trials (Daw et al., 2006; Jepma et al., 2010; Payzan-
LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011), and participants responded
as if only the very last trial was informative about value (Daw
et al., 2006; Jepma et al., 2010). It may be more difficult to esti-
mate uncertainty-driven exploration in this context, given that
participants would be similarly uncertain about all alternative
options that had not been selected in the most recent trial. In
our behavioral paradigms and model fits, we have attempted
to confront these issues allowing us to estimate uncertainty, its
effects on exploration, and the neural correlates of this
relationship.
First, it is helpful to note the ways that the current paradigm is
atypical in comparison to more traditional n-armed bandit tasks.
Initially, the task was designed not to study exploration, but
rather as ameans of studying incremental learning in Parkinson’s
patients and as a function of dopamine manipulation (Moustafa
et al., 2008). However, in the Frank et al. (2009) large-sample
genetics study, it was observed that trial-by-trial RT swings
appeared to occur strategically and attempts to model these
swings found that they were correlated with relative uncertainty.
Importantly, this is not just a recapitulation of the finding that the
model fits better when relative uncertainty is incorporated (i.e., ε
is nonzero); much of this improvement in fit was accounted for by
directional changes in RT from one trial to the next (RT swings).
This distinction is important: in principle a fitted nonzero ε could
capture an overall tendency to respond to an action that is more
or less certain, e.g., if a subject exploits most of the time, εwould
be negative (assuming the exploitation part of the model is
imperfect in capturing all exploitative choices).Akin to the points above regarding sticky choice, this may be
one reason that prior studies using bandit tasks have found
negative ε in some subjects, because they attempt to predict
choice on every trial assuming a factor that increases the likeli-
hood of choosing more uncertain actions. But, a tendency to
more often select a particular response would then lead to nega-
tive ε, even if subjects might, in the smaller proportion of explor-
atory trials, be more likely to explore uncertain actions. In
contrast, the RT swing analysis permits examining the degree
to which trial-to-trial variations are accounted for by the explora-
tion term in the model as a function of relative uncertainty and
fitted ε. The use of a continuous RT allows us to detect not
only when RTs change toward the direction of greater uncer-
tainty, but the degree of that change and its correlation with
the degree of relative uncertainty. This analysis is consistent
with our observation that explorers continued to be fit by positive
ε even in the simulations based on categorical responses—
meaning that when sufficiently uncertain they were more likely
to shift qualitatively from a slow to a fast response or vice-versa,
rather than only make small RT adjustments within a response
class.
Second, as noted above, we used a task with static reward
contingencies within a block, but changing contingencies
between blocks, to estimate the effect of uncertainty given the
history of action-outcome samples without the additional
complication of participants’ perceptions and beliefs about
how rapidly contingencies are changing within blocks.
Third, because it is difficult to integrate both frequency and
magnitude for different RTs to compute expected value within
a block, subjects cannot explicitly discover the programmed
expected value functions (and hence behavior is suboptimal).
Combining variation in both frequency and magnitude encour-
ages subjects to sample the space of RTs to determine whether
they might do better.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Fifteen (eight female) right-handed adults (age 18–27, mean 20) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and free of psychiatric and neurological conditions,
contraindications for MRI, and medication affecting the central nervous
system were recruited. Participants gave written informed consent and were
compensated for participation according to guidelines established and
approved by the Research Protections Office of Brown University. Participants
were paid $15/hr for their time.
Logic and Design
In order to investigate explore/exploit decisions, we employed a task used
previously (Frank et al., 2009; Moustafa et al., 2008) to study the influence of
relative uncertainty on exploratory judgments. The task is a variant of the basic
paradigm used to study exploration, in that multiple response options are
available with different expected values that are known with different degrees
of certainty based on previous sampling. The participants attempt to select
responses that maximize their reward. Importantly, however, the present
task separates learning into individual blocks within which the expected values
of the different response options remain constant. As a consequence, partic-
ipants’ uncertainty may be more readily estimated trial-to-trial without esti-
mating their beliefs about how the values are changing.
Participants viewed a clock arm that made a clockwise revolution over 5 s
and were instructed to stop the arm to win points by a button-press response
(Figure 1A). Responses stopped the clock and displayed the number of pointsNeuron 73, 595–607, February 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 605
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reward function of the current condition. The use of RT also provides a mech-
anism to detect exploratory responses in the direction of greater uncertainty,
because they can involve a quantitative change in the direction expected
without requiring participants to completely abandon the exploited option
(e.g., in some trials the exploration component might predict a shift from fast
to slower responses, and participants might indeed slow down but still select
a response that is relatively fast).
As already noted, learning was divided into blocks within which the reward
function was constant. However, the reward functions varied across blocks,
and at the outset of each block participants were instructed that the reward
function could change from the prior block. Across blocks,weused four reward
functions in which the expected value (EV; probability3magnitude) increased
(IEV), decreased (DEV), or remained constant (CEV, CEVR) as RT increased
(Frank et al., 2009; Moustafa et al., 2008) (Figures 1B–1D). Thus, in the IEV
condition, reward is maximized by responding at the end of the clock rotation,
while in DEV early responses produce better outcomes. In CEV, reward prob-
ability decreases and magnitude increases over time, retaining a constant EV
over each trial that is nevertheless sensitive to subject preferences for reward
frequencyandmagnitude.CEVR (i.e., CEVReversed) is identical toCEVexcept
probability and magnitude move in opposite directions over time.
Over the course of the experiment, participants completed two blocks of 50
trials for each reward function, with block order counterbalanced across
participants. While not explicitly informed of the different conditions, the box
around the clock changed its color at the start of each 50 trial run, signifying
to the participant that the expected values had changed. Note that even
though each reward function was repeated once, a different color was used
for each presentation and participants were told at the beginning of a block
that a new reward function was being used.
Within each block, trials were separated by jittered fixation null events
(0–8 s). The duration and order of the null events were determined by opti-
mizing the efficiency of the design matrix so as to permit estimation of
event-related hemodynamic response (Dale, 1999).
There were eight runs and 50 trials within each run. Each run consisted of
only one condition (e.g., CEV) so that participants could learn the reward struc-
ture. Each block was repeated twice during separate runs of the scan session
to eliminate confounds arising from run to run variation (e.g., scanner drift).
Details regarding full computational model, the model fitting, and basic fMRI
procedures and analysis are provided in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
Supplemental Results, Supplemental Discussion, two tables, and one figure
and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.12.025.
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